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Abstract
This study examines the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage on the value of
American firms. This study also seeks to extend the findings of Gill and Mathur (2011a). A
sample of 333 firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years from
2009-2011 was selected. The co-relational and non-experimental research design was used to
conduct this study. Overall, findings show that larger board size negatively impacts the value of
American firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on
assets, and insider holdings positively impact the value of American firms. The impact of
corporate governance and financial leverage differs between manufacturing and service
industries. Results show that board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing
firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider holdings
positively impact the value of American manufacturing firms. Findings also show that board size
negatively impacts the value of American service firms, and financial leverage and return on
assets positively impact the value of American service firms. This study contributes to the
literature on the factors that affect firm value. The findings may be useful for financial managers,
investors, and financial management consultants.
Keywords: CEO duality, Board size, Audit committee, Insider holdings, Financial leverage,
Firm size, Firm value.
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1. Introduction
Maximizing shareholders’ wealth is one of the corporate goals that cannot be ignored. The
market value of the firm is an important measure of the shareholders’ wealth. Corporate
governance and financial leverage play a big role in maximization of shareholders’ wealth.
While good corporate governance plays an important role in increasing market value of the firm
(Black, 2001; Klapper and Love, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner and Dchmid, 2005; Rouf,
2011; Gill and Mathur, 2011a), higher financial leverage decrease firm value by increasing
bankruptcy risk. Therefore, sound corporate governance and an optimal capital structure are
necessary for every firm to enhance the market value of the firm. Corporate governance is
defined as the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled (Kajola, 2008,
p. 16). An optimal capital structure includes some debt, but not 100% debt. It is a "best"
debt/equity ratio for the firm that minimizes the cost of financing and reduces the chances of
bankruptcy (Gill, Biger, and Mathur, 2011). Cuong and Canh (2012) found that the optimal debt
ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) should not exceed 59.27% because a higher debt ratio
negatively impacts firm value.
The financial scandals (e.g., Livent Inc., Corel Corporation, and Nortel) around the world and
collapse of major institutions in the USA (e.g., Enron, World Com, Commerce Bank, and XL
Holidays) have shaken investors’ faith in capital markets and the efficacy of existing corporate
governance practices in promoting transparency and accountability (Gill and Mathur, 2011b).
The shaken faith of investors has a negative impact on the market value per share and
consequently overall value of the firm. On the other hand, higher financial leverage increases the
chances of bankruptcy, which in turn, shake investors’ faith in capital markets. Thus, both
corporate governance and financial leverage impact on the value of the firm.
While Berle and Means (1932) were the first authors of corporate governance theory, Modiglani
and Miller (1958) pioneered capital structure theory. Since those time periods, different authors
tried to follow their paths to develop new theories. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976)
defined agency relationship (i.e., a contract between agent and principal to perform services on
behalf of the principal).
Since growth in firm value is very important to maximize shareholders’ wealth and to achieve
overall corporate goals and objectives, it is important to explore all the possible factors that
impact the value of the firm. Corporate governance and financial leverage of firms are important
factors that impact on the value of the firm. Therefore, this study examines the impact of
corporate governance and financial leverage on firm value. The results can be generalized to
service and manufacturing firms.
The proxy variables were selected from previous empirical work. The set of proxy variables
includes nine factors: CEO Duality, Board Size, Audit Committee, Financial Leverage, Firm
Size, Return on Assets, Insider Holdings, Industry Dummy, and firm value.
This study contributes to the literature on the relationships between corporate governance,
financial leverage, and firm value in at least two ways. First, it focuses on American firms while
very limited research has been conducted on such firms recently. Second, this study validates the
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findings of previous authors by testing the relationships between corporate governance, financial
leverage, and firm value of the sample firms. Thus, this study adds substance to the existing
theory developed by previous authors.

2. Literature Review
Good corporate governance is an important factor in improving the value of the firm. The impact
of corporate governance differs country to country because of disparate corporate governance
structures resulting from dissimilar social, economic, and regulatory conditions (Rouf, 2011).
This is also the case with financial leverage. Financial leverage has different impacts on the
value of the firm country to country because of the different tax brackets and tax laws of
different countries.
Corporate governance, in the context of this study, is defined as set of processes, customs,
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way the firm is directed and controlled (Rouf, 2011).
According to Kajola (2008, p. 17), the business of a firm is managed under the direction of a
board of directors who delegates to the CEO and other management staff (the day to day
management of the affairs of the firm). The directors, with their wealth of experience, provide
leadership and direct the affairs of the business with a high sense of integrity, commitment to the
firm, its business plans, and long-term shareholder value.
It is believed that larger board size negatively impacts the value of the firm. Rouf (2011, p. 238)
argues that small board size is generally believed to improve the value of the firm because the
benefit by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poor communication and
decision making of larger groups. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) also indicate that
the larger board size is less effective. It is, however, believed that if the CEO is the Chairman of
the Board, the firm value is improved because CEO duality improved firm performance
(Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010).
The audit committee also plays an important role in the improvement of firm value by
implementing corporate governance principles. The principles of corporate governance suggest
that the audit committee should work independently and perform their duties with professional
care. The audit committee monitors mechanisms that improve quality of information flows
between shareholders and managers (Rouf, 2011, p. 240), which in turn, help minimize agency
problems.
Although, insider holding contributes to enhancing firm value, its impact differs market to
market. Bhabra (2007) found that firm value is sensitive to differences in governance structures
across markets. The empirical studies on the impact of corporate governance and financial
leverage on firm value are as follows:
Black (2001) collected data from Russia and found that a firm's corporate governance behavior
can have a huge effect on its market value.
Gompers et al. (2003) used incidence of 24 governance rules to construct a “Governance Index”
to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1,500 large firms from the USA during the
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1990s. The authors found that the firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value;
that is, strong corporate governance improves the value of the firm.
Klapper and Love (2004) used data on firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14
emerging markets to conduct research on corporate governance. Their results suggest that firms
can partially compensate for ineffective laws and enforcement by establishing good corporate
governance and providing credible investor protection.
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) collected data from Singapore and Malaysia, and found a negative
relationship between the board size and firm value.
Sharma (2006) took a sample of Indian manufacturing firms and found that there is a direct
relationship between firm value and financial leverage.
Pattanayak (2008) examined the effect of insider ownership on corporate value in India for the
periods of 2000-2001 and 2003-2004, using 1833 Bombay stock Exchange listed firms. The
author found that firm value (measured by Tobin's Q) increases as ownership by insiders rises.
Rouf (2011) examined Bangladeshi firms and found a positive relationship between CEO duality
and firm value.
Gill and Mathur (2011a) took a sample of 91 Canadian manufacturing firms listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) for a period of three years [from 2008-2010] and found that
board size negatively impact of firm value, and CEO duality, firm size, and return on assets
positively impact the firm’s value.
Ryu and Yoo (2011) collected data from Korea and found a positive relationship between firm
value and inside management ownership.
Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011) used data of Chinese firms and found that managerial ownership
negatively impacts the ratio of total debt to total assets and the ratio of total debt to total assets
negatively impacts firm value.
Cheng and Tzeng (2011) collected data from 645 companies listed in the Taiwan Securities
Exchange (TSE) from 2000-2009 and found a positive relationship between leverage and firm
value.
Adeyemi and Oboh (2011) took a sample size of 90 firms from Nigeria and found that the
market value of a firm is positively influenced by its choice of capital structure (financial
leverage).
Cuong and Canh (2012) used a data set that included a combination of SEAs (seafood processing
enterprises) listed on two of Vietnam’s stock exchange markets from 2005 - 2010. The authors
found that the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) of less than 59.27% enhances
firm value.
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In summary, the literature review shows that both corporate governance and financial leverage
affect firm value.

3. Methods
The co-relational and non-experimental research design was used to conduct this study.
3.1 Measurement
To remain consistent with previous studies, measures pertaining to i) CEO Duality, Board Size,
Audit Committee, and Tobin’s Q were taken from Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), ii) Financial
Leverage, Firm Size, and Return on Assets were taken from Gill and Mathur (2011b), and iii)
insider holdings were taken from Abor and Biekpe (2007).
Table 1 shows the measurements of the dependent, independent, and control variables that
impact on firm value.
Table 1: Proxy Variables and their Measurements
Regression Equation: Q = + 1CDit +
Variables
Firm Value (Dependent Variable - Qi,t)

2BSit

+

CEO Duality (Independent Variable - CDi,t)
Board Size (Independent Variable - BSi,t)
Audit Committee (Independent Variable - ACi,t)
Financial Leverage (Independent Variable - FLi,t)
Firm Size (Control Variable - FSi,t)
Return on Assets (Control Variable - ROAi,t)
Insider Holdings (Control Variable - IHi,t)
Industry Dummy (Control Variable - Indi,t)

+ 7IHit + 8Indit + μit
Measurement
Q = (Market value of equity + Book value of debt) / Book
value of total assets
Assigned value 1 if same person occupied the post of the
chairperson and the CEO and 0 for otherwise
Measured as total number of directors serving on board
Measured as total number of audit committee members
FL = Total liabilities / Total assets
Measured as log of total assets
Net income / Total assets
Measured as percentage of insider share holdings
Assigned value 1 for manufacturing industry and 0 for
service industry

3ACit

+

4FLit

+

5FSit

+

6ROAit

μi,t = the error term
Qi,t = Value of firm i in time t
Q = Tobin’s Q

3.2 Data Collection
A database was built from a selection of approximately 800 financial-reports that were made
public by publicly traded companies between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011. The
selection was drawn from Mergent Online [http://www.mergentonline.com/compsearch.asp] to
draw a random sample of American firms. Out of approximately 800 financial-reports
announced by public companies between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011, only 333
financial reports were usable. The cross sectional yearly data were used in this study. Thus, 333
financial reports resulted in 999 total observations. Since a random sampling method was used to
select companies, the sample is considered as a representative sample.
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For the purpose of this study, certain industries were omitted due to the type of activity. For
example, all financial services companies were omitted. In addition, some of the firms were not
included in the data due to lack of information for the time periods under study.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of independent, dependent, and control variables. The
explanation on descriptive statistics is as follows:
i) Total observations: 333 x 3 = 999
ii) BS: 10.25 millions
iii) AC: 4.09
iv) FL: 54%
v) ROA: 7%
vi) IH: 8%
vii) Q (Tobin’s Q): 3.08
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (2009-2011)

BS
AC
FL
FS
ROA
IH
Q

Minimum
3
1
0.08
1.87
-0.020
0.01
1.08

Maximum
18
10
0.97
5.13
0.35
0.88
25.71

Mean
10.25
4.09
0.54
3.51
0.07
0.08
3.08

Std. Deviation
2.34
1.37
0.18
0.62
0.05
0.14
2.95

3.4 Bivariate Correlation Analysis
The Pearson correlation was used to measure the degree of the linear association between
independent and dependent variables. It was used to find how closely related two variables are
(e.g., CD and Q). This relationship is assumed to be linear, and the correlation is a measure of
how tightly clustered data points are about a correlation line. Correlation ranges from -1 to +1.
Overall, Q is positively correlated with CD, AC, and FS. In the manufacturing industry, Q is
positively correlated with CD, AC, FL, and FS. In the service industry, Q is positively correlated
with FL and FS (see Table 3).
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Table 3: Pearson Bivariate Correlation Analysis

Q
CD
BS
AC
FL
FS
ROA
IH
Ind

Q
CD
BS
AC
FL
FS
ROA
IH

Q
1

CD
0.117*
1

Q
1

CD
0.176*
1

Q
1

CD
0.000
1

BS
0.058
0.067
1

Entire Sample (N = 333)
AC
FL
FS
0.168**
0.405**
0.229**
0.063
-0.007
0.140*
0.439**
0.252**
0.463**
1
0.080
0.328**
1
0.354**
1

ROA
-0.002
0.063
-0.022
-0.015
-0.247**
-0.138*
1

Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 183)
BS
AC
FL
FS
0.076
0.195**
0.338**
0.249**
0.141
0.117
0.036
0.096
1
0.532**
0.269**
0.563**
1
0.078
0.379**
1
0.372**
1

BS
0.037
0.007
1

Service Industry Sample (N = 150)
AC
FL
FS
0.104
0.594**
0.201*
-0.040
-0.029
0.200*
0.348**
0.221**
0.345**
1
0.107
0.257**
1
0.337**
1

Q
CD
BS
AC
FL
FS
ROA
IH
**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Q = Tobin’s Q
CD = CEO duality
BS = Board size
AC = Audit committee
FL = Financial leverage
FS = Firm size
ROA = Return on assets
IH = Insider holdings
Ind = Industry

IH
0.047
-0.088
-0.109*
-0.117*
-0.053
-0.242**
0.097
1

Ind
0.030
0.128*
-0.082
0.097
-0.096
-0.001
0.003
-0.110*
1

ROA
-0.010
0.106
-0.040
0.005
-0.244**
-0.046
1

IH
0.057
0.044
-0.233**
-0.199**
-0.151*
-0.227**
0.093
1

ROA
0.014
0.016
-0.002
-0.042
-0.252**
-0.251**
1

IH
0.054
-0.178*
-0.029
-0.023
0.005
-0.269**
0.103
1

4. Regression Analysis, Findings, Discussion, Conclusion, Limitations, and
Future Research
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression analysis was used to conduct data analysis.
Multiple regression analysis is useful to find the influence of more than one independent variable
on the dependent variable (Zainodin et al., 2011) and it allows researchers to explicitly control
for many other factors that simultaneously affect the dependent variable. Therefore, multiple

8
regression analysis is useful to test the relationships between independent and dependent
variables.
4.1 Regression Analysis and Findings
Overall, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table 4); that is, larger board
size negatively impacts the value of American firms. Positive relationships i) CD and Q, ii) AC
and Q, iii) FL and Q, iv) FS and Q, v) ROA and Q, and IH and Q were found; that is, CEO
duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on assets, and insider holdings
positively impact the value of the American firms. A non-significant relationship between Ind
and Q was found; that is, the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage differs
between manufacturing and service industries.
In the manufacturing industry, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table
4); that is, larger board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing firms.
Positive relationships i) CD and Q, ii) AC and Q, iii) FL and Q, iv) FS and Q, and v) IH and Q
were found; that is, CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider
holdings positively impact the value of American manufacturing firms. A non-significant
relationship between ROA and Q was found; that is, return on assets has no impact on the value
of American manufacturing firms.
In the service industry, a negative relationship between BS and Q was found (see Table 4); that
is, larger board size negatively impacts the value of American service firms. Positive
relationships i) FL and Q and ii) ROA and Q were found; that is, financial leverage and return on
assets positively impact the value of American service firms. Non-significant relationships
between i) CD and Q, ii) AC and Q, iii) FS and Q, and iv) IH and Q were found; that is, CEO
duality, audit committee, firm size, and insider holdings have no impact on the value of
American service firms.
Table 4: OLS Regression Estimates on Factors Affecting Firm Value a, b, c
Entire Sample (N = 333)
[R2 = 0.238; Adjusted R2 = 0.219; SEE = 2.61; F = 12.64; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000]
Regression Equation: Q = -3.132 + 0.595*CD - 0.219*BS + 0.370*AC + 6.834*FL + 0.611*FS + 6.225*ROA +
2.179*IH + 0.231*Ind
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Coefficients c
Collinearity Statistics
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Tolerance
VIF
(Constant)
-3.132
1.014
-3.089 0.002
CD
0.595
0.294
0.101
2.025 0.044
0.954 1.048
BS
-0.219
0.075
-0.174
-2.929 0.004
0.668 1.496
AC
0.370
0.119
0.172
3.099 0.002
0.766 1.305
FL
6.834
0.867
0.425
7.883 0.000
0.809 1.236
FS
0.611
0.285
0.128
2.145 0.033
0.660 1.514
ROA
6.225
3.052
0.103
2.039 0.042
0.920 1.087
IH
2.179
1.045
0.105
2.084 0.038
0.921 1.086
Ind
0.231
0.297
0.039
0.778 0.437
0.940 1.064
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Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 183)
[R2 = 0.220; Adjusted R2 = 0.189; SEE = 3.16; F = 7.05; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000]
Regression Equation: Q = -3.773 + 1.010*CD - 0.353*BS + 0.556*AC + 6.624*FL + 1.010*FS + 3.210*ROA +
3.961*IH
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Coefficients c
Collinearity Statistics
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Tolerance
VIF
(Constant)
-3.773
1.550
-2.435 0.016
CD
1.010
0.488
0.141
2.071 0.040
0.959 1.043
BS
-0.353
0.139
-0.228
-2.532 0.012
0.549 1.821
AC
0.556
0.194
0.230
2.865 0.005
0.691 1.447
FL
6.624
1.465
0.339
4.521 0.000
0.792 1.262
FS
1.010
0.471
0.183
2.147 0.033
0.612 1.634
ROA
3.210
5.160
0.043
0.622 0.535
0.922 1.084
IH
3.961
2.091
0.133
1.895 0.060
0.911 1.098
Service Industry Sample (N = 150)
[R2 = 0.406; Adjusted R2 = 0.376; SEE = 1.65; F = 13.84; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000]
Regression Equation: Q = -1.779 + 0.058*CD - 0.136*BS + 0.132*AC + 7.174*FL + 0.270*FS + 7.924*ROA +
0.636*IH
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Coefficients c
Collinearity Statistics
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
Sig.
Tolerance
VIF
(Constant)
-1.779
1.010
-1.761 0.080
CD
0.058
0.280
0.014
0.208 0.835
0.923 1.083
BS
-0.136
0.063
-0.157
-2.153 0.033
0.785 1.273
AC
0.132
0.117
0.079
1.129 0.261
0.851 1.175
FL
7.174
0.794
0.643
9.035 0.000
0.826 1.211
FS
0.270
0.276
0.077
0.978 0.330
0.669 1.494
ROA
7.924
2.812
0.194
2.818 0.006
0.886 1.128
IH
0.636
0.851
0.051
0.747 0.456
0.898 1.114
a
Dependent Variable: Q (Firm value)
b
Independent Variables: CD, BS, AC, FL, FS, ROA, IH, and Ind
c
Linear Regression through the Origin
SEE = Standard Error of the Estimate

Note that:
● A test for multicollinearity was performed. All the variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients
are less than 2 and tolerance coefficients are greater than 0.50. Multicollinearity refers to a
situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are highly
linearly correlated. Multicollinearity can be perfect if the correlation between two independent
variables is equal to 1 or -1. The issue of multicollinearity arises when there is a strong linear
relationship among two or more independent variables. VIF is useful to detect whether one
predictor has a strong linear association with the remaining predictors (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis,
2006). As a rule of thumb, tolerance of less than 0.10 and VIF greater than 9 indicate a
multicollinearity problem. To explain further, VIF of 9 indicates that (all other things being
equal) the variance of the ith regression coefficient is 9 times greater than it would have been if
the ith independent variable had been linearly independent of the other independent variable(s) in
the analysis. Thus, it explains how much the variance has been inflated by this lack of
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independence. VIF greater than 9 creates problems for researchers because it leads to poor
results in regression analysis. The elimination of one or more of the independent variables that
are highly correlated with the other independent variables can minimize poor regression results
issues (O’Brien, 2007).
● Overall, Ind, FS, ROA, CD, IH, AC, FL, and BS explain 23.8% of the variance in Q.
● In the manufacturing industry, IH, CD, ROA, AC, FL, FS, and BS explain 22% of the variance
in Q.
● In the service industry, IH, FL, AC, CD, ROA, BS, and FS explain 40.6% of the variance in Q.
4.2 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to find the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage
on the value of American firms. Overall findings show that larger board size negatively impacts
the value of American firms, and CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size,
return on assets, and insider holdings positively impact the value of American firms. The impact
of corporate governance and financial leverage differs between manufacturing and service
industries.
Results show that board size negatively impacts the value of American manufacturing firms, and
CEO duality, audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, and insider holdings positively
impact the value of American manufacturing firms.
Findings also show that board size negatively impacts the value of American service firms, and
financial leverage and return on assets positively impact the value of American manufacturing
firms.
The findings of this study lend some support to the findings of Black (2001), Gompers et al.
(2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Sharma (2006), Pattanayak (2008),
Rouf (2011), Gill and Mathur (2011a), Ryu and Yoo (2011), Cheng and Tzeng (2011), Adeyemi
and Oboh (2011), and Cuong and Canh (2012). The findings of this study, however, contradict
the findings of Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011). Table 5 shows the summary of the findings of
previous authors related to the impact of corporate governance and financial leverage on firm
value.
Table 5: Previous Findings on the Impact of Corporate Governance and Financial Leverage on
Firm Value
Author
Black (2001)
Gompers et al. (2003)
Klapper and Love (2004)

Findings
Found that a firm's corporate governance behavior can have a huge effect
on its market value.
Found that the firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm
value; that is, strong corporate governance improves the value of the firm.
Findings suggest that firms can partially compensate for ineffective laws
and enforcement by establishing good corporate governance and
providing credible investor protection.

Country/Markets
Russia
USA
Emerging Markets
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Mak and Kusnadi (2005)
Sharma (2006)
Pattanayak (2008)
Rouf (2011)
Gill and Mathur (2011a)
Ryu and Yoo (2011)
Ruan, Tian, and Ma (2011)

Cheng and Tzeng (2011)
Adeyemi and Oboh (2011)
Cuong and Canh (2012)

Found a negative relationship between the board size and the firm value.
Found that there is a direct relationship between firm value and financial
leverage.
Found that firm value (measured by Tobin's Q) increases as ownership by
insiders rises.
Found a positive relationship between CEO duality and firm value.
Found that board size negatively impact of firm value, and CEO duality,
firm size, and return on assets positively impact the firm’s value.
Found a positive relationship between firm value and inside management
ownership.
Found that managerial ownership negatively impacts the ratio of total debt
to total assets and the ratio of total debt to total assets negatively impacts
firm value.
Found a positive relationship between leverage and firm value.
Found that the market value of a firm is positively influenced by its choice
of capital structure (financial leverage).
Found that the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) of less
than 59.27% enhances firm value.

Singapore and Malaysia
India
India
Bangladesh
Canada
Korea
China

Taiwan
Nigeria
Vietnam

In conclusion, larger board size is not in the favor of American firms because it has a negative
impact on the value of the firm. Therefore, American firms should use an optimal board size
based on firm size.
The CEO duality improves the value of the firm. Therefore, it can be considered in favor of
American firms. Although CEO duality improves the value of the firm, it may not be beneficial
for very large multinational firms. The CEO may take high risk to expand in the global market to
increase the value of the firm. CEO duality may also lead to an agency problem. For example,
the CEO may not work in the favor of internal and external stakeholders to maximize their
wealth. Therefore, CEO duality should be used with caution (Gill and Mathur, 2011, p. 11).
Results also show that audit committee, financial leverage, firm size, return on assets, and insider
holdings improve the value of American firms. Although, financial leverage helps enhance firm
value, higher financial leverage can lead to bankruptcy. According to Cuong and Canh (2012),
the optimal debt ratio (total debt to total assets ratio) should not exceed 59.27% because a higher
debt ratio negatively impacts firm value.
CEO duality, board size, audit committee, and financial leverage are positively correlated with
firm size (see Table 3); that is, larger firm size leads to CEO duality, larger board size, larger
audit committee, and higher financial leverage. Although, CEO duality and larger audit
committee are in the favor of the firm, higher financial lavage should be used with caution
because it can lead to bankruptcy. Large audit committee is, however, in the favor of the
American firm because it helps improve the firm value by monitoring the CEO and board
actions. Audit committee monitoring forces the CEO and board of directors to work in the favor
of shareholders and maximize stakeholders’ wealth. In addition, an audit committee minimizes
agency problem by improving the flow of information between managers (agent) and
shareholders (principal).
The positive impact of insider holdings (shareholdings by executives, managers, and employees)
on firm value (see Table 4) explains that managers and employees work hard to maximize firm
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value, which in turn, maximizes shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, stock options compensation for
executives, managers, and employees may be beneficial for the American firms to improve their
market values.
4.3 Limitations
The sample size of this study is small. This study is limited to American manufacturing and
service firms. Therefore, the findings of this study could only be generalized to firms similar to
those that were included in this research.
4.4 Future Research
Future research should include a large sample from different countries. Future study should
include other variables such as board composition, CEO tenure, and institutional ownership.
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